Japanese resistance ... was already negligible

Apologists for the Yalta concessions maintain that Japan in February 1945 presented the aspect of a formidable, unbeaten enemy. Therefore, so the argument runs, Roosevelt was justified in paying a price for Soviet intervention, in the interest of ending the war quickly and saving American lives.

But Japanese resistance to American air and naval attacks on its own coasts was already negligible. American warships were able to cruise along the shores of Japan, bombarding at will. According to an account later published by Arthur Krock, of the New York Times, an Air Force general presented a report at Yalta pointing to the complete undermining of the Japanese capacity to resist. --America's Second Crusade, pg 218

все-таки привожу еще один отрывок, для сравнения с оправданиями атомных бомбардировок, которые в свете этого - бесстыдное вранье.

еще забавно на стр. 227: Eisenhower was profoundly innocent in high politics. - он хотел сказать ignorant, наверное.

The manipulation of public opinion at home and abroad in time of war is a necessary but delicate task. It should be entrusted only to individuals of proved patriotism.

вторая половина книги посвящена провалам администрации Рузвельта (и правительства Черчилля) в отношениях с кровавым сталиным. а надо было: угрожать сепаратным миром с Германией, прекращением поставок по ленд-лизу, и тому подобным, тогда сталин бы испугался и уступил Польшу и прочее, вот как. опять же много рыданий по поводу communist sympathizers в рузвельтовской администрации, ну и шпионы конечно.

Stalin questioned the expediency of the “ unconditional surrender” formula at the Teheran Conference. He felt that it merely served to unite the German people. The announcement of specific terms, however harsh, in Stalin's opinion would hasten the German capitulation.

But Roosevelt clung to his pet phrase with an obstinacy worthy of a better cause. His vanity and prestige were deeply involved.

Черчилль тоже: The principle of Unconditional Surrender will be adhered to so far as Nazi Germany and Japan are concerned

It is certainly arguable that if the statesmen in Paris in 1919 had been as reasonable and cool-headed as their predecessors in Vienna a century earlier and worked out a peace of moderation, the Hitlerite madness would never have possessed the German people.

...
It is sometimes suggested that the Morgenthau Plan has been exaggerated or misrepresented. There is no excuse for misunderstanding, however, because Morgenthau himself has published the full text of the plan in a book which contains elaborate suggestions about why and how it should be put into effect. pg 304

и дальше там он объясняет почему Черчилль согласился на план Моргентау. познавательно.