simulated selves

He tends, in short, toward the view that consciousness is most coherently viewed as a fundamental rather than emergent aspect of the physical world, and hence something on the order of a brute fact, like electromagnetism or gravity. --Reality Minus by David Bentley Hart

это он про Чалмерса. ну-ну...

So, obviously, if conscious, thinking subjects with free will (assuming there is such a thing) could exist together within a simulated world, with the power to affect one another and their shared phenomenal environment for either good or ill, then by that very token they and their world would be no less real than one composed of such physical ingredients as basic particles, molecules, and organic tissues.

ну правильно, и что? дальше он пишет: ...in a simulated world, only simulated selves could exist; no one — absolutely no one — ever will or could be at home there. и чем ему не нравятся simulated selves? Он спорит (ругается!) с Чалмерсом на довольно примитивном уровне, я бы сказал: Even as “conceivability” arguments go, this one is pretty feeble. It presumes everything it is meant to prove.

дальше там вообще чушь, начиная с Would it not make more sense to assume that the brain’s capacity for mentality... Syntax cannot exist prior to or apart from semantics, and neither exists except in the intentional activity of a mind. - как раз наоборот, синтаксис первичен.