The Amorality of Power Politics

There has always been some demagoguery in Nasser, of course (as there has been in every national leader, Eastern or Western, of any importance), but something other than demagoguery accounts for the way he has consistently won his game with almost all players, certainly with the United States and the Soviets if not with the Israelis.

--The Game of Nations: The Amorality of Power Politics by Miles Copeland

там много подобных откровений.

At the same time, Mr. Kennan argued convincingly that if Europe was to be divided the blame should be placed on the Russians and not on ourselves. Winston Churchill, in a speech delivered at Fulton, Missouri, referred to the “Iron Curtain,” and the presence of President Truman at his side implied official U.S. Government endorsement of such an attitude. Apart from this one lapse, however, official policy was still to pretend that the “spirit of Yalta” guided our actions and that the United Nations, with understanding and cooperation between the great “peace-loving” powers, would maintain order throughout the world by thrashing things out between themselves in a civilized manner. Internal Government communications, written or oral, that indicated otherwise were marked TOP SECRET.

следует отметить использование кавычек и заглавных букв.

про выборы в Сирии стр. 46-47 замечательно смешно, следует читать весь длинный абзац со слов To say that the elections did not come up to our expectations would be an understatement. это все, по-моему, вполне можно отнести и к американскому вмешательству во Вьетнаме.

там же на стр 47 чудесная формулировка “coordinator of unconventional political activity” ну там все подряд надо читать, там полно таких фраз: Keeley loved the Syrians, and he persisted in a belief that they were “naturally democratic.”

Hinton has since grown up, but in those days he was a devout Goo-Goo—one who believes that even in a country like Syria, Good Government is not only desirable but possible. ... The first Hinton knew of the actual coup was on the day it happened. As he, Meade and I were making a reconnaissance tour of Damascus that morning, he fulminated at length on the theme: “I want to go on record as saying that this is the stupidest, most irresponsible action a diplomatic mission like ours could get itself involved in, and that we’ve started a series of these things that will never end.” He subsequently wrote a dispatch on the subject and sent it by slow boat to the Department, where it now gathers dust in the archives. Things have, of course, come out as he predicted. - pg 52

ex libris